

The U.S. Army Initiates a
Proactive Approach to
Leverage CrossCultural Understanding: The
Case for the Culture & Foreign
Language Enterprise

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**Abstract**: This article will describe how the U.S. Army has created a culture & foreign language enterprise in an effort to leverage cross-cultural understanding in support of U.S. Army mission objectives. Topics to be addressed include problems and challenges related to cultural issues that the U.S. Army has encountered since September 11, 2001 during military operations in Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan and surrounding countries in the region and steps taken to address these problems and challenges.

Such topics describe the workings of the Army bureaucracy as it sought to maneuver resources in a manner that could effectively address culturally oriented issues and obstacles. The resulting approaches that have been created, funded, defended and sustained are detailed as examples of how large government institutions can persevere with agility to address such goals.

The primary focus of this article, regarding the aforementioned, is the Army Culture & Foreign Language Enterprise. The life of this Enterprise exemplifies how a vision for utilizing civilian social science Ph.D.s, in support of Army goals & objectives related to culture, came to fruition and effectively functions. This description illustrates how such an Enterprise approach can be employed in other types of settings and with other types of issues.

**Keywords**: U.S. Army, cross-cultural understanding, culture, foreign language, public affairs

# 1. Approaches to the Problem

The September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States significantly altered the context within which the U.S. Army functions. A sense of urgency became a paramount theme that has, at times, served to dilute critical thinking processes that were more prevalent in the pre-911 (September 11, 2001) world. The passage of time has allowed for this sense of urgency, while still there, to find its rightful place within a pecking order of priorities. This passage of time has provided opportunity for observation and reflection regarding decisions and

subsequent actions that have been implemented affecting U.S. foreign policy and military actions.

In his book *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*, Thomas Ricks describes in detail vivid mistakes that occurred in relation to cultural issues linked to U.S. Army functioning. Significant in this scenario, according to Ricks, is a lack of awareness regarding cross-cultural communication dynamics (Ricks, 2006, p. 238). His highlighting of cross-cultural concerns is couched within other themes in the book. Such topics include focus on the role of military doctrine, the Bush rationale for military intervention in Iraq, problems associated with strategy, confusion regarding the notion of counterinsurgency, misuse of the U.S. Army, cross-cultural issues and parallels with U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

Important cultural norms were trampled as the Army sought to achieve their objectives. "Entering the private space of the house where the women and children were, then tying up and interrogating (i.e, humiliating) the man in the house in front of his family, the premier cultural value of family honor was violated....You've created a blood debt when you do that" (Ricks, 2006, p. 238). Such scenarios played out over and over again during the U.S. military occupation of Iraq. Making enemies when we should be making friends created significant obstacles to U.S.-Iraq relations.

"Each Iraqi owed it to himself and his family to decide whether it made more sense to cooperate with us or to cooperate with somebody else, the insurgents. Unfortunately, because of our incompetence, more and more Iraqis have made the decision that their interests don't lie with us" (Ricks, 2006, pp. 325-326). This is depicted as one of many cascading failures. Other such culturally oriented failures include, but are not limited to, the Abu Graib prison abuses, burnt Qur'ans, U.S. Special Forces troops urinating on dead enemies etc. It is worth noting that mass media broadcast of such failures served to amplify the depth and breadth of damage to the U.S. cause in the region and around the world.

# **A Move Toward Being Culturally Proactive**

Against this backdrop the U.S. Army leadership saw the need to address culturally oriented challenges and acted on that realization. One such action resulted in implementation of the Human Terrain System, that involves placement of social science Ph.D.s (primarily Anthropologists) on the ground with Army troops in Iraq & Afghanistan, and development of an Army Culture & Foreign Language Enterprise that focuses on creation of an Enterprise composed of social science Ph.D.s whose function is to instill culturally oriented emphasis in the education & training of U.S. Army troops. This author serves as the Lead Social Scientist of the latter. He was hired to serve as the first Lead Social Scientist of the Army Culture & Foreign Enterprise during the conceptualization stage of development and has readily observed it's evolution and impact.

The beginnings of the Army Culture & Foreign Language Enterprise can be traced to a memo released by Army four-star general William Wallace on 4 December, 2008 that was directed to Commanding Generals/Commandants at CoE's (Centers of Excellence) throughout the Army.

He explained "It is time to execute some initial steps to implement the Army Culture & Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS). I want to initialize these steps even before the ACFLS is finalized in order to generate some momentum and leverage your current initiatives" (Wallace, 2008). He went on to instruct "I want you to hire a culture and foreign language

advisor. This advisor is to be a senior member of your staff to integrate all efforts across your directorates in your organization" (Wallace, 2008). Wallace was Commanding General of HQ TRADOC (Headquarters, Training & Doctrine Command) at the time and his directive carried considerable weight in the creation of the Enterprise.

This memo was reinforced with a follow-up memo from the next TRADOC CG (Commanding General), four-star General Martin Dempsey. His 22 September, 2010 memorandum to CoE CGs/Commandants builds upon the 2008 Wallace memo by stressing "On 4 December, 2008 General Wallace, CG TRADOC, issued a memorandum directing specific organizations to hire a culture and foreign language advisor. Thus far, only five of 15 CFLAs have been filled. It was noted during the Quarterly OE Review on 1 July, 2010 that organizations with CFLAs on board were making significant progress to the culture and foreign language education programs" (Dempsey, 2010). General Dempsey asserts "Commanders of organizations that do not have a CFLA (Culture & Foreign Language Advisor) on board . . . will contact the ACFLMO (Army Culture & Foreign Language Management Office) immediately for assistance in hiring a CFLA" (Dempsey, 2010). This author is listed as the Point of Contact, regarding who is to be contacted for follow-up information about the directive in that memo.

General Dempsey soon after advanced to the position of CSA (Chief of Staff of the Army). Within one year of this memo he was serving as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, the relevance of cultural concerns was clearly recognized at senior levels of the Army and DoD (Department of Defense).

The Wallace and Dempsey directives were echoed in the Army Leaning Concept for 2015. The specific relevance of cultural emphasis is clearly stressed. "The Army operates with and among other cultures, engaging adaptive enemies where indigenous populations, varying cultures, divergent politics, and wholly different religions intersect. This requires developing Soldiers who understand that the context of the problem matters and that their understanding of the non-military world of foreign societies and cultures should be broadened. Soldiers and leaders need to learn general cultural skills that may be applied to any environment as well as just-in-time information that is specific to their area of operations. The Army culture and foreign language strategy requires both career development and pre-deployment training to achieve the culture and foreign language capabilities necessary to conduct full-spectrum operations" (Army Learning Concept for 2015, p. 11).

There was a recognized need to proactively leverage cross-cultural understanding in such a way that this knowledge can be harnessed and used as foundation for effective decision-making. The option, or status quo at that point, was to merely react to cross-cultural problems when they occurred. The Abu Graib prison abuses yesterday, burnt Qur'ans today, what problem is waiting to happen tomorrow? We are going to gain much more ground being on the cultural offensive than to continually find ourselves spontaneously responding to cultural problems & challenges and being on the cultural defensive whereby victory is seen to be merely protecting the posture we are presently in.

## The Army Culture & Foreign Language Management Office

Within this framework the Army Culture & Foreign Language Management Office (ACFLMO) was founded to build the Army Culture & Foreign Language Enterprise (ACFLE) in accordance with the Army Culture & Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS). Four individuals were hired to address this task.

Captain (U.S. Navy, retired) Dave Ott was hired in the fall, 2009 to serve as Director of the ACLFMO. Dave, an Annapolis graduate, had been a naval aviator and went on to work various intelligence/targeting assignments. He is known to be gifted with entrepreneurial tasks within the DoD community and was brought in to navigate the DoD waters and "make things happen." That he does.

Colonel (U.S. Army, retired) Eric Stanhagen was hired in the winter, 2010 as ACFLMO Deputy Director. Eric, a West Point graduate, had a distinguished career in Special Forces, has an acute understanding of the Army bureaucracy and exercises sound judgment regarding details supporting strategies and tactics for getting ACFLMO objectives accomplished. He was a "by name" hire by Dave Ott. They had worked closely together, in an operational setting, during their active duty years.

Captain (U.S. Navy, retired) Bruce (Rocky) Wilkinson was hired in fall, 2009 during the initial months of the ACFLMO standup. He had served the U.S. Navy as a career intelligence officer. Like Eric, he has an innate sense for macro-level DoD concerns, but also evidences a keen eye for details regarding specific practices and protocol concerns.

A common process regarding ACFLMO advancement is for Dave to have the initial inspiration of an idea, Eric provides insight regarding if it is realistic and how it might be approached and Rocky nails down the specifics of how to proceed insofar as how to move ahead and via what channels. Working with them, observing this process, is akin to watching a ballet. Each dancer with his part.

This author, Colonel Jim Schnell, Ph.D. (U.S. Air Force Reserve, retired), was hired in spring, 2010 as the Lead Social Scientist. He had 30 years service in the military intelligence community with the final 14 years as Assistant Air Attache to China. His background as a social science Ph.D., working in civilian universities, provides him with insights for recruiting CFLA candidates, vetting credentials, interviewing and the hiring process.

Central to the effective functioning of these four members of the ACFLMO is that there is a high level of expertise (all four have attained the rank equivalent of 0-6/Colonel) and a climate of respect & trust that makes for productive working relationships. Dave Ott, as Director, can be credited for working to create and maintain this contextual backdrop for ACFLMO functioning.

The ACFLMO was originally situated in the G-2 (Intelligence) directorate of TRADOC in that it was observed to be the most appropriate domain to place the ACLMO function. It reported to the head of G-2, Maxie McFarland, via Dave Ott (the ACFLMO director). The ACFLMO staff and all CFLAs were hired on two year contracts with the allowance for renewable contracts beyond that.

## The Culture & Foreign Language Advisor (CFLA) Enterprise

The ACFLMO manages the CFLA enterprise via hiring of CFLAs and placement at the following locations: Maneuver CoE (Fort Benning, GA), Infantry & Armor Schools (two positions filled by Drs. Ron Holt & Dr. Toni Fisher); Maneuver Support CoE (Fort Leonard Wood, MO), Engineer, Military Police, & Chemical Schools (one position initially filled by Dr. Tseggain Isaac and subsequently filled by Boshra El-Guindy); Intel CoE (Fort Huachuca, AZ), Intel School (one position that is covered by the TRADOC Culture Center); Aviation CoE (Fort Rucker), Aviation School (one position filled by Dr. Mandouh El-Nady);

Signal CoE (Fort Gordon, GA), Signal School; BCT/SSI CoE (Fort Jackson, SC), Basic Combat Training, Finance, Adjutant General Schools (one position filled by Dr. El-Rayah Osman); Sustainment CoE (Fort Lee, VA), Army Logistics University, Quartermaster, Transportation, & Ordnance Schools (two positions filled by Drs. Andrew Kosydar & Howard DeNike); Fires CoE (Fort Sill, OK), Artillery, Air Defense Artillery Schools (two positions filled by Drs. Daryl Liskey & Hassan Ahmed); AWC (Carlisle Barracks, PA), Army War College (one position filled by Dr. Adam Silverman); USASMA CoE (Fort Bliss, TX), Sergeants Major Academy (one position filled by Dr. Scott Wilson).

Since inception the CFLAs have been guided by a very basic directive used as a foundation to build from. That directive rests within the following statement. The mission of the Army Culture and Foreign Language Management Office (ACFLMO) is to manage the implementation of the Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS). Fifteen Culture and Foreign Language Advisors (CFLAs) have been placed at the TRADOC (Training & Doctrine) Centers of Excellence (CoE). The CFLA function is to assist CoE leaders by working to infuse culturally oriented emphasis into CoE programming. Each CoE has unique areas of focus and, thus, the CFLA positions at each CoE are unique insofar as they reflect the goals of each particular CoE.

The CFLA selection process, as administered by the ACFLMO, is rigorous and involves thorough vetting to ensure top quality CFLAs, holding verifiable Ph.D.s, are placed at the CoEs. The only exception to the aforementioned hiring process involved the two CFLAs at Fort Leavenworth. These two CFLAs serving CGSC, ILE (Command & General Staff College) CoE (Fort Leavenworth, KS), Mr. Sameh Yousseff and Mr. Mahir Ibrahimov, were hired via other means that involved a different hiring mechanism.

CFLAs are hired for an initial two-year period and can typically be renewed for two year increments. Some of the CFLAs, such as professors who hold tenured faculty positions in a university, choose to participate for a two years and then return to their university (with the possibility of returning to the CFLA enterprise later). Others seek to remain in their CFLA positions via two year renewals. Thus, the CLFA Enterprise has balance between long and short term CFLAs.

A significant aspect of the vetting process, during the recruitment of CFLA candidates, focuses on ensuring that claims of academic credentials are legitimate. In civilian higher education, where such academic credentialing concerns are commonly dealt with, familiarity with this issue helps ferret out fraudulent claims in fairly short order. However, this author found that claims of academic credentials can easily go undetected in domains outside of higher education, such as government, because most people in such settings simply are not aware how easy it is to make a fraudulent credential claim and have it go undetected.

A grey area in that regard involves degrees from "diploma mills," which equates with paying a fee and getting a Ph.D. in return after writing a report (or not even that) and receiving the necessary course credits for "life experiences." Such Ph.D. degrees are a sham, clear and simple, but this author has observed first hand how such claims can go unchallenged. A simple way to ensure legitimate claims, that is the universal routine practice in civilian higher education, is to require that a certified copy of the Ph.D. transcript be sent to the hiring organization directly from the university that has granted the degree. Then the quality of such institutions can be gauged to ensure legitimacy. That approach was used by this author in his role as Lead Social Scientist. All CFLAs hired by this office followed this procedure and Ph.D. transcripts for such CFLAs are kept on file in the ACFLMO.

The CFLA Enterprise functions very much like a university faculty. Each CoE benefits from the regional area expertise of the CFLA assigned to that CoE but each CoE also benefits from

the regional expertise areas of all the CFLAs in the Enterprise. So the CFLA assigned to Fort Leonard Wood, who has Middle-East area expertise, can call on the CFLA from Fort Gordon if Central Asia expertise is needed. Thus each CoE can benefit from the expertise of their locally assigned CFLA(s) and the expertise of all the CFLAs posted at other CoEs.

# The CFLA Enterprise as Flat & Agile Organizational Entity

The CFLA Enterprise is flat, agile and can change directions in short order. It places CFLAs with each CoE/school to create a flat, highly communicative Enterprise that is rich in geographic, academic and operational diversity and assists Commandants in providing the best possible culture & foreign language offerings within Program of Instruction (POI) parameters. The CFLA Enterprise garners efficiencies, eliminates redundancies and builds coherence of effort.

It contrasts the larger DoD bureaucratic system within which it is positioned and serves. The larger DoD bureaucracy functions for the most part via position descriptions and vividly clear expectations but also does allow for innovation. The CFLA enterprise, in contrast, is driven primarily by innovative applications while giving secondary emphasis to more standardized expectations.

The relevance of this unique enterprise approach, within the larger DoD system, cannot be overstated. For instance, the emphasis on culture is about education versus training. The CFLA enterprise is predicated on that realization. It is a given. Whereas the larger Army is much more about training versus education. Training is much easier to design, implement and assess. Education is more vague and has more levels of abstraction involved. The CFLA Enterprise recognizes these challenges and operates from a better position to engage such challenges given the flat and agile nature of the structure from which it operates.

An Enterprise is understood to be a collection of people, processes and technology within organizational structures that have a set of purposes in common. It generally refers to people and organizational components that exist in many organizations and function as a network. This is commonly labeled as Network Centric Operations (Ott, 2010).

This kind of process and content often run counter to the instinctual nature of functioning that can evolve over time when Army members (Soldier and civilian) become used to defining their work landscape in terms of vivid blacks and whites rather than more abstract shades of grey. They are not to be faulted for having such an orientation. The system within which they work prescribes, and rewards, such mindsets. This is much more about the bureaucratic nature of organizations than it is about the individuals or being that it is the military.

As such there are organizational anti-bodies that innately reject the mission and structure of the CFLA Enterprise approach. This is where the multi-faceted talents of the ACFLMO have vividly come into play to protect the enterprise and work to carve out niches where the CFLA Enterprise can not only survive but thrive. The collective understanding of Dave Ott, Eric Stanhagen and Rocky Wilkinson has been key in that regard.

Each CFLA has a regional area of expertise (East Asia, Middle East, Africa etc.) and other areas of expertise. For instance, some CFLAs have significant backgrounds with survey methods and qualitative methodologies. There are frequent exchanges of information among the CFLAs via e-mail, telephone, CFLA teleconferences and CFLA conferences. Most common are e-mail exchanges whereby all the CFLAs receive a message sent by one of the other CFLAs or member of the ACFLMO and this typically begins a dialog that can result in exchanges that go on over a period of days. Sometimes specific CFLAs have a specific interest in some facet of a topic and can arrange to discuss an issue via phone.

Once a month, on the third Tuesday of each month at 1-2:30 p.m. (Eastern Time), CFLAs call in to the ACFLMO phone system to participate in a CFLA teleconference that involve guidance from the ACFLMO, discussion of various topics of concern and general announcements affecting the enterprise. Less common are the CFLA conferences where CFLAs meet as a group with the ACFLMO for a few days to discuss issues of concern that can benefit from extensive discussion.

The CFLA enterprise embraces a high degree of academic freedom for the individual CFLAs. That is, CFLAs enjoy considerable freedom to operate independently so as to generate an abundance of ideas. This approach works very well with brainstorming and prompts a wide range of considerations regarding problem solving and how to address challenges. After everybody conveys input on an issue, if there is not a consensus, then the ACFLMO offers a ruling that typically involves some sort of compromise. This approach usually allows us to generate quality ideas and reinforce respect for diversity of thought.

Beyond the CFLA Enterprise, the CFLAs have periodic exchanges with entities who provide degrees of support for our common efforts and concerns. The Cultural Knowledge Consortium (CKC), which includes a wide range of Army people and organizations that focus on culture, provides a forum for exchange on a variety of topics affecting cultural understanding. Similarly, Army Knowledge Online (AKO) provides a website where Army personnel can post information and seek information about a variety of topics, including culture.

## The Army Culture & Foreign Language Strategy

The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS) has served as the functioning framework for the CFLA Enterprise. It was created in December, 2009 and has guided much of the development of the CFLA program. The overall goal is to "build and sustain an Army with the right blend of culture and foreign language capabilities to facilitate full spectrum operations, now and in the future" (Army Posture Statement, 2011). "The ACFLS goal is to establish a baseline of culture & foreign language capabilities for all leaders and Soldiers to support the accomplishment of unit missions . . . . The resulting force will have the ability to effectively conduct operations with and among other cultures" (Smith, 2012, p. 3).

Use of such a strategy as a guide is not common in such contexts but it has been used to ensure the CFLA Enterprise has the freedom to identify the most pressing issues and speculate on how these issues can best be addressed. To be constrained by too many details, that may lack in relevance, would only fog the environment CFLAs are working in. Thus, the strategy was designed to be a guide, not a directive. It was intended to undergo significant revision. This kind of flexibility has been key to the success of the CFLA Enterprise.

The ACFLS seeks to fix the "gap" in culture and foreign language capability by focusing on the capabilities we have versus what we need. It seeks to integrate efforts across the Army. It is nested in the Army Leader Development Program (ALDP) and defines requirements by cohort for culture and foreign language within the general purpose force (GPF). The overall goal being to build and sustain an Army with the right blend of culture and foreign language capabilities to facilitate unified land operations.

It is worth noting that the Army's Leader Development Strategy prescribes that the future security environment will require leaders who *understand* the context of the factors influencing the military situation, *act* within that understanding, continually *assess and adapt* those actions based on the interactions and circumstances of the enemy and environment,

consolidate tactical and operational opportunities into strategic aims, and be able to effectively *transition* from one form of operation to another. As leaders and Soldiers support full spectrum operations, challenges in how we conduct military operations will require agility and innovation as new adaptive threats that employ a mix of new and old strategies and technologies emerge (TRADOC, 2011, p. 1).

Without a coherent strategy we have a scenario where there are many oars rowing but no movement. The strategy provides a framework preparing individuals & units, Soldiers & leaders and it develops experts as well as the general force. It does this via two paths, career development (life-long learning) and pre-deployment, that move toward the desired end state of building and sustaining an Army with the right blend of culture & foreign language capabilities to facilitate full spectrum operations.

Thus, the overarching goal can be recognized as developing and maintaining expeditionary forces that are led by Soldiers who are ready to deploy and operate effectively anywhere in the world across the full spectrum of conflict. This will require leaders who have sufficient cross-cultural, regional and foreign language competencies to enable the successful execution of military operations...not only an understanding of the culture and language in a particular area, but an understanding of the implications these considerations have on how operations are conducted. To achieve this goal, leaders and Soldiers must increase their cultural knowledge through operational experience, self-development, or as a learning opportunity during their professional military education. Within TRADOC, this will require schools and centers to develop, integrate and deliver cross-cultural education within their respective programs of instruction (TRADOC, 2011, p. 2)

## **Cross-Culture Competence as Primary Theoretical Construct**

The primary theoretical consideration in the life of the CFLA Enterprise focuses on cross-cultural competence (3C). It is directly, and indirectly, related to much of what we do on a daily basis. "Cross-cultural competence is based on a set of knowledge, skills and attributes (KSAs) developed through education, training and experience that provide the ability to operate effectively in any culturally complex environment" (Department of Defense, 2010, p. 1).

Cross-cultural competence is recognized as a force multiplier that can significantly enhance operations. It can develop over time through experience, but can also be accelerated by principled learning methods. Cross-cultural competence enables negotiation and persuasion; mediation and conflict resolution; leadership and influence; cultural evaluation, synthesis, and predictive analysis during staff planning; and other abilities that pertain to a specific geographic area. Additional characteristics are:

- 1) Cross-cultural competence provides awareness of culture and of one's own cultural context, general cross-cultural schema and culture-analytic models, and an increasingly complex understanding of the impact of culture on military planning and operations (knowledge).
- 2) Critical aspects of cross-cultural competence are interpersonal and communication skills, flexibility in seeing different cultural frames and perspectives, and the ability to regulate one's own reactions (skills).
- 3) Necessary ingredients of cross-cultural competence are non-ethnocentric attitudes,

motivation to learn about culture and to update one's knowledge base as new information is encountered and empathy grows (attributes). (TRADOC, 2011, p. 2)

Focus on cross-cultural competence can be recognized in various areas of the defense establishment and has been building over time. It is evidenced in the 2004 National Military Strategy, underscored in the 2008 National Defense Strategy and reiterated in the 2010 National Security Strategy. The 2006 National Security Strategy exemplifies such emphasis in that there is a stated need for "actively engaging foreign audiences, expanding educational opportunities for Americans to learn about foreign languages and cultures and for foreign students and scholars to study in the United States" (National Security Strategy, 2006, p. 45). Emphasis on cross-cultural skills has received attention at the highest levels of the U.S. government. In March 2009, Defense Secretary Robert Gates conveyed "Global competence, which consists of foreign language skills and cross-cultural communication, has now become a national critical competency . . . . Just about every military member of our Armed Forces will serve in a foreign country at some point in their military careers. . ." (Department of Defense, 2010, p. 9).

Similarly, Ms. Gail McGinn, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Plans) followed up in June, 2009 with the assertion that has resonated throughout DoD (Department of Defense). "Cross-cultural competence is a force multiplier, allowing members of the Total Force who have not received in-depth training to operate in a multi-cultural environment . . . Most importantly, 3C enables all members of the Total Force to adapt to a multi-cultural force, to multi-cultural conditions, and to multi-cultural operating environments" (Department of Defense, 2009, p. 4).

In most basic terms cross-cultural competence can be understood through the "Framework of 3C Core Competencies & 3C Enablers." They stress Thinking Factors--applying cultural knowledge, organizational awareness & cultural perspective taking; Connecting Factors-communication, interpersonal skills & cultural adaptability; Resilience Factors--focusing on the self, emotion & cognition; and Engagement Factors--learning & interaction (Defense Language Office, 2011, p. 4).

The "Framework of 3C Core Competencies & 3C Enablers" serve as foundation for seven "Core Competency Learning Recommendations" (Defense Language Office, 2011, pp. 7-16). These recommendations are well grounded in the academic literature and this grounding reinforces the legitimacy of the Framework.

Recommendation One: Applying Cultural Knowledge stresses considerations such as culture, cross-cultural communication, common cultural processes, cultural evolution, multiple layers of cultures (McDonald et al., 2008) and common cultural behaviors/systems & structures/beliefs & values (Selmeski, 2009). This also includes emphasis on operational culture (NAVMC 3500.65, 2009), environmental cues (Wisecarver et al., 2010), history/politics/religious factors (Ross et al., 2010), geographical features (McDonald et al., 2008) and current social/ethnic/language features (Russell et al., 1995).

Recommendation Two: Organizational Awareness promotes concern with organizational mission, social systems, policies and requirements (Wisecarver, 2010). These areas are accented with focus on military cultures (McDonald, 2010) and cross-cultural teamwork skills (Sutton et al., 2006; Tuckman, 1965).

Recommendation Three: Cultural Perspective Taking Skills include conceptual basics, observing & interpreting skills and skills with navigating point of view of others. Conceptual

basics relate to the role of cultural roots, cultural models & attitude formation (Russell et al., 1995) along with cultural assumptions, values & biases (Wisecarver et al., 2010). Observing & interpreting skills deals with situational cues (Abbe, 2007; McCloskey et al., 2009), perceptual cues & cultural context (Wisecarver et al., 2010) and tactical, operational & strategic planning (Ross et al., 2010). Skills with navigating point of view of others address cultural assumptions (Abbe et al., 2007), self perception processes (McDonald et al., 2008), sensitivity to diversity (Hardison et al., 2009) and cultural values & assumptions (Wisecarver et al., 2010).

Recommendation Four: Communication Skills involves nonverbal and verbal concepts & skills. The nonverbal frameworks stress acceptable behavior considerations (Wisecarver et al., 2010), relevance of nonverbal behaviors (NAVMC 3500.65, 2009), typical nonverbal cues (McDonald et al., 2008) and acceptable display rules (Russell et al., 1995). The verbal frameworks focus on survival and tactical language skills (NAVMC 3500.65, 2009) and audience expectations (Wisecarver et al., 2010). Similarly, the role of listening skills and intercultural perspectives are acknowledged (INCA, 2004).

Recommendation Five: Interpersonal Skills primarily addresses cross-cultural contexts (Mendenhall et al., 2008), conflict oriented relations (Hardison et al., 2009) and persuasive techniques (Russell et al., 1995). These primary concerns are reinforced via secondary concerns of rapport (Mendenhall et al., 2008), language barriers (Wisecarver et al., 2010) and emotional/psychological needs (Mendenhall et al., 2008).

Recommendation Six: Cultural Adaptability deals with adapting behavior in other cultural contexts (Abbe et al., 2007) and behavioral adjustment considerations (Wisecarver et al., 2010). The relevance of these variables are enhanced via understanding of situational integration (Ross et al., 2010), self monitoring efforts (Mendenhall et al., 2008) and situational interpretation (Ross et al., 2010).

Recommendation Seven: 3C Core Enablers outline a wide range of suggested learning concerns. These areas of concern focus on critical thinking & perspective taking (Matsumoto et al., 2007), stress exposure (Driskell & Johnston, 1998) and emotion management (Matsumoto et al., 2001). Supplementary support skill areas include self-correction (Smith-Jentsch et al., 1998), and cultural adaptability (Sutton et al., 2006).

A related major component of the culture development program is regional competence. Regional competence is a set of knowledge, skills, and attributes related to a particular country, region, organization, or social group, which enables effective adaptation to that specific culture. Additional characteristics:

- 1) Awareness of the historical, political, cultural (including linguistic and religious), sociological (including demographic), economic, and geographic dimensions of a foreign country, global region, or other specific culture.
- 2) Enables negotiation and persuasion; mediation and conflict resolution; leadership and influence; cultural evaluation, synthesis, and predictive analysis during staff planning; and many other abilities that pertain to a specific area of operations.
- 3) Ability to adopt perspectives common to that culture; ability to regulate one's own behavior, communication, and emotional expression to match cultural norms where appropriate. Includes positive attitudes toward the population and motivation to learn about the culture, to include how they make decisions. (TRADOC, 2011, pp. 2-3)

## **Duties of the Culture & Foreign Language Advisor**

The primary roles of the CFLA are to infuse cultural awareness into the CoE curriculum where he/she serves, advise the CoE how to meet the cultural requirements set forth by the OPORD (Operations Order), teach courses, provide lectures within sections of courses, initiate interest with culturally oriented programming and participate with special projects that are brought to CFLA attention by the ACFLMO and their CoE. An example of the latter occurred when AFRICOM (African Command) requested CFLA assistance with U.S. troop preparations for duty in Africa. Four CFLAs have substantial expertise with the African continent and were tasked to assist with this undertaking. The ACFLMO is periodically contacted about these types of special projects and draws from the expertise of the CFLA enterprise to address such needs as they arise.

Each CoE is unique and has needs that are unique to that location so each CFLA is encouraged to address what is specifically needed at his/her CoE rather than be being bound by minute details of a standard job description. However, at the same time, there are common ground considerations that are shared across the CFLA Enterprise. The following list of such considerations is not meant to be seen as requirements but, rather, as areas the CFLA can consider stressing.

Thus, a fully developed Army Culture & Foreign Language Program can be understood with regard to the following:

- 1) Have a clear Culture & Foreign Language strategic document that acknowledges its particular situation and mission.
- 2) Have a clear mandate from the CG, be nested in the Staff and appropriate Task Organization with appropriate mission and vision statements.
- 3) The CFLA should work as a colleague with various directorates and libraries across the organization.
- 4) The CFLA should act as a liaison to other COEs and Army organizations as well as the cultural centers of other military services.
- 5) Have a well developed plan that seeks to infuse cultural awareness in relevant areas of the curriculum.
- 6) Have a website with easy access to culture and foreign language resources.
- 7) Maintain a library that carries culture & foreign language resources and related materials.
- 8) Maintain good media relations for high visibility and reputation.
- 9) Sponsor language programs, culture programs and guest lectures on the COE installation.
- 10) Have training and education available to DoD (Department of Defense) civilians.
- 11) Support pre-deployment training.
- 12) Encourage lifelong learning initiatives.
- 13) Ensure appropriate budgeting plans are in place to support the work of the CFLA and related programming.
- 14) Constantly evaluate trends in the world-wide operating environment.
- 15) Engage in active outreach with other CFLAs at various COEs as a means to improve cultural programming.

Assessment of CFLA functioning, with regard to contract renewal, is addressed primarily by the CoE being served based on their view of how well they are being served by the CFLA. It

is addressed secondarily by the ACFLMO insofar as gauging how well the CFLA maintains linkage with the CFLA enterprise mission and practices. A key venure for the ACFLMO to do that is via the CFLA portfolio that is to be prepared by the CFLA.

CFLAs function with a high degree of autonomy. Most DoD positions are organized in such a way that the employee has a job description which is used to evaluate performance. That is, performance is measured against the standard of the position description. The CFLA existence is more abstract in that the needs of the CFLA position are unique to that location and the needs are constantly changing. The CFLA has a high degree of freedom to do whatever he/she thinks should be done. A possible shortcoming with this scenario is that there can be a lack of accountability and mismanagement, with regard to CFLA functioning, in comparison to more standard DoD positions.

### The CFLA Enterprise in Relation to Army Leader Development

A significant circumstance that frames the work of the CFLA is that cultural emphasis exists within the larger context of leader development concerns. As such, cross-cultural education should build on the foundation of an individual's existing leader attributes which in turn reinforces the core leader competencies of leading others, developing oneself and achieving results:

- 1) *Character*. A leader of character internalizes the Army Values, lives by our Professional Military Ethic, reflects the Warrior Ethos and displays empathy towards Soldiers, families and those people affected by the unit's actions. Competence places an individual in position to lead character makes him or her an effective leader.
- 2) *Presence*. A leader of presence has credibility, exudes confidence and builds trust. Presence is conveyed through actions, appearance, demeanor and words.
- 3) *Intellect*. A leader of intellect has the conceptual capability to understand complex situations, determine what needs to be done and interact with others to get it done. Leaders must have the ability to reason, to think critically and creatively, to anticipate consequences and to solve problems. (TRADOC, 2011, p. 4)

### The Way Forward

The CFLA Enterprise, conceptually and thematically, represents innovative initiative with regard to the content it is addressing and the format it is using to do so. It portrays how the military can learn from the past, understand the present and exercise vision with speculation about the future. The CFLA enterprise exemplifies approaches that manifest competency with all three concerns.

The relevance of cultural understanding has been stressed since the beginnings of organized society. The lessons seem to be relearned from generation to generation via recognition of their relevance. The efforts of the CFLA Enterprise seek to approach such cultural phenomena in a manner that will have lasting impact and provide a solid foundation for development of applicable models for enhancement of cultural understanding.

Toward that end, this report is intended to record a point on the CFLA Enterprise timeline so that weaknesses can be diminished and strengths can be capitalized on. The path to preeminence is typically littered with outdated assumptions and rejected theories. This report

provides a beginning baseline from which the effectiveness of the CFLA Enterprise can be measured and gains can be gauged.

On a larger scale, findings from this report convey how the Enterprise model can be used with varied types of initiatives. The idea of creating a flat, agile enterprise within a deep, entrenched bureaucracy challenges standard inside-the-box assumptions but, at times, can produce outside-of-the box results that are beneficial and visionary in scope. The report serves as a contribution to that fund of knowledge and intention.

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